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This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government 
ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion 
incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally 
provides a tournament incentive in China’s emerging market, as it is positively associated 
with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are 
controlled by the government and where the CEO is politically connected, but it became 
stronger after the China's split-share structure reforms. Further, we find that in state 
controlled firms the satisfaction gained by meeting multiple economic and social goals 
largely reduces the effectiveness of tournament incentives, while the managerial agency 
problems inherent in private firms might mitigate them.  
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1. Introduction  
     Executive pay dispersion, defined as the pay differential between the CEO and other 
executives, has implications for the inner workings of the top executive team, and for overall 
firm performance (Bebchuk et al., 2011). While many studies examine the level and structure 
of executive compensation and its relationship with performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990; 
Yermack 1996; Core et al. 1999; Murphy 1999), controversy remains about how executive 
pay differentials arise and affect firm performance (Kale et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2011; 
Chen et al., 2011a). Since the emergence of the global financial crisis, the media has been 
critical of the large gap in pay between CEOs and employees in most countries, and of the 
resulting severe agency problems and inequality. While many governments have tried to 
reduce the gap by restricting ever-higher CEO compensation1, public anger and resentment of 
it has not ceased.     
 The extant literature tends toward two views regarding the optimal (or appropriate) level 
of pay dispersion. The tournament viewpoint sees the pay differential in the corporate 
hierarchy as defining an arena where individuals compete for promotion and rewards. High-
performing executives with considerable managerial potential win promotion and 
commensurate compensation. A large spread of compensation across corporate hierarchical 
levels attracts talented and venturesome participants to compete in the managerial tournament 
by providing extra incentives to exert effort. This viewpoint supports the view that a large 
pay dispersion is necessary to provide appropriate incentives for executives to perform (Main 
et al., 1993; Eriksson, 1999; Kale et al., 2009).2  The entrenchment viewpoint sees the large 
pay gap between the CEO and other executives as giving an indication of CEO power 
(Lambert et al., 1993), since powerful CEOs are entrenched and find it easier to expropriate 
shareholder wealth. Empirical studies show that the excess executive-pay gap might reflect 
                                                             
1 These governments include the U.S., Germany, the U.K., France, Sweden, China and some others. Specifically, the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury has announced a $500,000 cap on top-paid executives for the most distressed financial 
institutions, and the German government places a €500,000 cap on top executives in banks in financial distress. 
2 Empirical evidence is mixed on the tournament viewpoint. For example, O’Reilly et al. (1988) do not find support for the 
tournament argument in a sample of 105 Fortune 500 firms, and Conyon et al. (2001) report that variation in executive 
compensation is not associated with enhanced firm performance in a sample of 100 UK firms in 1997. 
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agency problems and reduce firm value and performance (Adams et al., 2005; Landier et al., 
2008; Bebchuk et al., 2011).  
Evidence from emerging markets such as China has only recently started to appear. Chen 
et al. (2011a) document that managerial powers are positively related to executive 
remuneration, and organizational levels and contestant numbers have positive effects on pay 
differences between executives. They provide preliminary evidence that the pay gap has a 
positive effect on firm performance, and that this effect is stronger in firms that are relatively 
less controlled by the government. Lin and Lu (2009) also find that the pay gap is positively 
related to firm performance, and that this relationship is more significant with higher 
managerial power (defined as larger managerial ownership and longer tenure of the CEO). 
Although the evidence for pay dispersion's positive effect on performance has been 
established, there is no comprehensive analysis showing how it affects firm performance and 
by what mechanism.  
 This paper extends the existing literature by examining the channels through which the 
institutional features of emerging markets shape executive pay dispersion, and how they 
affect tournament incentives in China’s listed firms. Specifically, it identifies the institutional 
features that can affect pay dispersion and the relationship between pay dispersion and firm 
performance, including state ownership, CEO political connections and reform of the split-
share structure. Moreover, in contrast to Lin and Lu (2009), this paper follows Bebchuk et al. 
(2011) in treating managerial power as an entrenchment, and investigates its impact on the 
association between pay dispersion and firm performance.  
     The institutional background of China’s listed firms encompasses several important 
features that shape executive pay dispersion, and which may differ from those in the U.S. and 
other countries. First, while CEO compensation has been increasingly important, and more 
related to firm’s profits since China's economic reform of executive compensation (Groves et 
al., 1994; Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006b; Zheng et al., 2008; Cao et al., 2011a), the 
executive pay dispersion remains constrained by the dominance of state ownership and 
government intervention. In addition to the goals of maximizing shareholders’ value, the state 
owner (in other words, the government) also has non-economic goals of maintaining social 
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equality and harmony. Due to these non-economic goals, the pay differential in the corporate 
hierarchy, especially in SOEs, would attract close political scrutiny because it is a potential 
point of conflict. Furthermore, the competition for completion of these non-economic goals 
does not necessarily lead to an improvement in performance (Jensen, 2001).  Independent 
from the incentives provided by executive compensation, performance improvement in SOEs 
could be related to policy support obtained from the government. Secondly, an implicit 
incentive scheme such as perquisites, political promotion, chasing personal fame and other 
“grey” income on the position seems to be prevalent, but not directly observable, in China’s 
emerging market (Chen et al., 2010b; Cao et al., 2011b). In such an economic environment, 
which lacks a functioning external labour market, the complexity of executive incentive casts 
doubts on the value of explicit monetary compensation. This study applies the notion of pay 
dispersion to such market conditions to understand executive incentive.  
      In accordance with previous research (Kale et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2011),  this 
study measured CEO pay dispersion by i) the pay gap between the CEO and other top 
executives (GAP), and ii) the ratio of CEO pay to the total compensation of the top five 
executives within the top management team (CPS). It shows that the mean pay gap is 
250,868RMB (equivalent to 36,891USD), which is much lower than the 778,000USD 
reported by Kale et al. (2009), and the ratio of CEO pay to the aggregate compensation of the 
top five executives across our sample in China is 31.9%, which is around 3.9% lower than the 
figure found by Bebchuk et al., (2011) for U.S firms. Moreover, pay dispersion in privately 
controlled firms is 30.1% larger than in SOEs, and the CPS is 6.5% higher. In private firms 
where CEOs are politically connected, the pay gap is 20% higher and the CPS is 10% higher 
than in those where the CEOS do not have such connections. 
     Our empirical analysis find that pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance, 
which supports the tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and that the positive effect 
of CEO pay dispersion on firm performance is weaker in state-controlled firms and in firms 
where CEOs are politically connected. We further found in a subsample of SOEs that 
tournament incentives are weaker if firms seek for goals that are more political, such as the 
remittance of tax imposed by governments; in a subsample of private firms, tournament 
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incentives become weaker if the CEO is also the owner who controls the firm. These findings 
suggest that the multiple goals of SOEs and agency problems in private firms will reduce 
tournament incentives. In addition, we found that a split-share structure reform strengthens 
the positive relationship between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance, although this 
amplification is weaker in SOEs and stronger in private firms. This was particularly so after 
the reform where CEO pay dispersion began to have a significant effect on stock-market 
performance when measured as stock return.  
These results remained robust when the endogeneity of pay dispersion was taken into 
consideration and alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance were applied. 
When we controlled for granting stock options and perks, our results still supported the main 
findings listed above. Overall, our findings suggest that institutional features such as state 
ownership, political connections and market reform play an important role in tournament 
incentives in China;  these incentives in turn mitigate the agency problems between 
shareholders and managers because pay dispersion is appropriately aligned with the CEO’s 
relative talents and contributions, and provide extra incentive to top executives.   
     Our study contributes to the literature on executive compensation by first focusing on 
comparisons of the level of executive compensation (e.g., Kaplan, 1994; Abowd and Kaplan, 
1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Kato and Long, 2005), and then by exploring the 
institutional background in which executive pay dispersion arises, and examining its different 
implications for firms in developed economies like the U.S.  
     Second, we extend the extant literature on the theory of executive incentive. Prior studies 
have examined whether executive pay dispersion provides a tournament incentive (Lazear 
and Rosen, 1981; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2001; Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006; Kale et al., 
2009; Bebchuk et al., 2011), but the evidence is mixed, because tournaments should depend 
on their economic value and cultural environments (Burns et al., 2011). Some researchers 
have found the executive pay gap to be positively associated with firm performance in 
China’s firms (Lin and Lu, 2009; Chen et al., 2011a), indicating that Chinese cultural values 
such as collectivism, and firm characteristics such as managerial power, have a substantial 
effect on tournament incentives. In addition to examining the effect of ownership types on 
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executive pay dispersion, our study explores deeper reasons that shape tournament incentives 
in different types of firms, and examines other institutional features in China such as political 
connections and the influence of split-share structure reform in China.  
        Third, we contribute to the emerging debate on the pay gap between CEOs and other 
employees since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, and whether the pay gap should be 
regulated (Conyon et al., 2009; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009; Core and Guay, 2010; Garner 
and Kim, 2010). Questions about the appropriate level and structure of executive 
compensation as an incentive mechanism for better firm performance still exist, as does the 
question of whether tournament theory even holds as an explanation for the large CEO pay 
gap found in the U.S. and elsewhere. The effect of pay restrictions imposed by regulators 
might be traded off by limiting tournament incentives.  
   The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the background and 
develops hypotheses; Section 3 provides a description of data and methodology; Section 4 
discusses empirical results; Section 5 presents robustness tests; and Section 6 draws some 
conclusions from the findings. 
 
2. Background and hypothesis 
2.1 Executive pay dispersion and firm performance in China 
A performance-based contract links managerial compensation to firm performance; this can 
tempt managers to manipulate the output level when performance is unobservable (Kale et al., 
2009). Rank-order tournaments solve this problem in that tournament commitments are set in 
advance, which is why Lazear and Rosen (1981) proposed that setting a large pay gap can 
mitigate agency problems when monitoring costs are too high. This large pay dispersion 
between the CEO and other executives is regarded as a "prize" that provides executives with 
incentives to compete, and in turn to increase firm performance. Some implications of the 
effects of pay dispersion on firm performance have been discussed in previous studies. In 
particular, Kale et al. (2009) find that the CEO pay gap exerts a positive effect on firm 
performance (measured as return on assets and Tobin’s Q). It is argued that in China, the 
corporate governance environment is less efficient, and outside stakeholders will focus on 
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internal monitoring mechanisms to set a larger pay dispersion and an efficient pay scheme.  
Within a sample of Chinese listed firms, Chen et al. (2011a) document that pay dispersion is 
positively related to earnings per share (EPS), while Lin and Lu (2009) find that the pay gap 
is positively related to return on equity. Based on this discussion, we conjecture that a larger 
pay dispersion will be optimal for creating an incentive, and provide the following hypothesis:  
H1: The executive pay dispersion is positively associated with firm performance. 
 
2.2 The executive incentive, pay dispersion and institutional environment in China 
If CEO pay dispersion is an important source of tournament incentives for managers, then 
the motivations that a tournament initiates, as well as its consequences, should be related not 
only to firm characteristics (e.g., Kale et al., 2009), but also to the firm’s institutional 
environment. Previous research has found that the ratio of CEO compensation to non-CEO 
executive compensation varies significantly across firms, as well as across country and 
cultural variables (Burns et al., 2012). This study examines whether several key institutional 
features in China’s emerging markets influence the incentive provided by executive pay 
dispersion. 
2.2.1 SOEs' multiple objectives in China 
After 1978, when the Chinese government began to transform the original planned 
economy into a market-oriented economy, state-owned firms were corporatized and 
privatized, and some were listed on either of the two stock exchanges in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. Even though these privatized or carved-out state owned enterprises (SOEs) were 
transmitted to act as their counterparts in western countries, with investment and financing 
decision-making decentralized from state to firm level, they inherited the responsibilities of 
their predecessors by taking over a wide range of social and political goals in addition to just 
maximizing shareholder value.   
In general, a salient feature of state ownership is the existence of multiple objectives. As 
SOEs are controlled by the government, their decisions are subject to the influence of the 
government; thus, SOEs can be understood as agents of the government in the capital market. 
Moreover, because these SOEs receive policy and financial support from the government, 
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they are also required to satisfy social objectives such as stable employment levels and social 
stability, and political objectives such as controlling sensitive industries by creating 
monopolies. Unlike a typical shareholder in market economies, the state shareholders in 
China face the multiple challenges of increasing production and maintaining social stability. 
In particular, multi-task theory has been offered to capture the trade-off between production 
and social stability (Bai et al., 2000). Given these multiple objectives, the Chinese 
government has imposed restrictions on the pay gap between executives and ordinary 
workers since the 1980s (Chen et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2010). Meanwhile, SOEs have put 
more emphasis on guaranteeing workers lifetime employment, paying for health care and 
education for their children and honoring their commitment to a large number of retired 
former employees, which in turn contributes to social stability (Bai et al., 2006).  State 
shareholders placing greater importance on the objective of maintaining social and political 
stability, rather than improving economic performance (Chang and Wong, 2009), will tend to 
reduce the effectiveness of executive incentives, including pay dispersion as a tournament 
incentive to improve firm performance.  
 Alternative incentives also exist within SOEs. For example, gaining political promotion in 
China’s giant government hierarchy may provide a stronger incentive for firm performance 
(Cao et al., 2011b); perks are more likely to motivate managers to work for the interests of 
shareholders in China (Chen et al., 2010; Adithipyangkul et al., 2011); top managers may 
take advantage of their position or abuse managerial power for personal gain or fame, and to 
circumvent any restrictions on pay, etc. Therefore, explicit compensation that interacts with 
other incentives might be influenced significantly by the fact that the firm is controlled by the 
state. 
Therefore, we conjecture that executive pay dispersion would provide less tournament 
incentive for improving firm performance in SOEs than in private firms because SOEs are 
responsible for satisfying multiple economic and social goals imposed by governments.  Thus 
we suggest the following hypothesis: 




2.2.2 Political connections 
Political connection is a common phenomenon across the world in publicly listed firms, 
particularly those with a concentrated ownership structure and a weak corporate governance 
system (Faccio, 2006; Chen et al., 2011b). Some evidence suggests that political connection 
can bring benefits to companies by accessing the key resources controlled and allocated by 
the government, including bank loans, favorable tax treatment, preferential corporate bailouts  
and government subsidies (Faccio et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008). In this sense, executive 
incentive is less aligned to firm performance because firms with political connections rely 
less on their executives' performance to evaluate them. In addition, politically connected 
CEOs are likely to entrench themselves by providing unique political capital; moreover, they 
face a lower replacement probability and require higher compensation (Aslan and Grinstein, 
2011; Cao et al., 2012).  
On this basis we conjecture that pay dispersion in firms with political connections is 
steeper; the higher compensation offered in firms with political connections may reflect rents 
captured by the CEO, and thus they can be viewed as a product of agency (governance) 
problems. Executives can win the tournament "prize" by connecting with governments rather 
than exerting more effort, which will reduce tournament incentives as a means of improving 
firm performance (Chen et al., 2011a).  
In addition, previous studies have focused on the roles played by CEOs with political 
connections in private firms (Li et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Cao et al., 2012). Researchers 
have argued that private firms, rather than SOEs, are chosen as the sample for studying 
political connections because at the time they were formed, SOEs naturally built connections 
with the government, and it seems difficult to distinguish whether political capital in SOEs 
comes from the nature of state ownership or the political connections of executives and 
boards. However, private firms have their own objectives for maximizing market value, and 
are not bearing the monitoring of government regulations, so the favorable treatment they 
receive from government should be attributed to politically connected executives. Therefore, 
a CEO’s political connection is expected to have a substantial effect in private firms. We 
formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
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H3: The positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance is weaker in 
firms where the CEO is politically connected, especially in private firms. 
  
2.2.3 Market reforms 
Evidence shows that market developments such as better investor protection, stronger 
legal enforcement and greater market competition, leads to increasing equity financing and 
firm value (La Porta et al., 1998, 2002). Then those shareholders who face more-intense 
market competition will tend to offer steeper incentives and higher compensation, and thus 
induce greater effort.  For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) find a growing level of 
executive compensation in the U.S. in the 1990s. Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Hubbard 
and Palia (1995) argue that market competition requires executives to have more managerial 
talent and take higher risks, and  thus should receive higher compensation.  
In a market economy, to ensure that executives are appropriately motivated and that their 
talent is successfully acquired and retained, shareholders must provide higher compensation 
in an explicit contract. Thus, along with the progress of market-oriented reforms in China, we 
expect the dispersion of executive pay to grow and provide more incentive to improve firm 
performance. For example, in April 2005, China’s capital market launched a split-share 
structure reform aimed at converting non-tradable shares (typically held by the state and legal 
persons) into tradable shares. This reform has induced the development of a more market-
oriented compensation plan and increased market competition (Li et al., 2011). Hence, we 
provide the following hypothesis:  
H4: The positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance has become 
stronger since the split-share structure reform was launched. 
 
3. Data and model 
3.1 The sample 
Our empirical tests are based on all Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges between 2005 and 2010. Our sample year starts in 2005, when compensation 
for individual executives (including CEO, CFO, Chairman, and other executives) began to be 
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disclosed in annual reports3 . Before 2005, the listed firms only disclosed the aggregate 
payment of the top three executives. We excluded firms flagged with ST and *ST from our 
total population,  as this denotes special treatment due to irregularity in financial reporting, 
and negative profit for two or three consecutive years. We also excluded firms in the finance 
industry because of their unique accounting standards, and firms with missing observations 
on the main variables used in our analysis. Our final sample consists of 7,811 firm-year 
observations. Executive compensation, corporate governance and financial data for the firms 
were obtained from the firms' annual reports and the CSMAR database. 
3.2 Variable definition 
CEO pay dispersion 
Following Kale et al. (2009) and Bebchuk et al. (2011), we adopted two primary 
measurements for tournament incentives. The first measurement, GAP, is defined as the log 
of difference between CEO pay and the median pay of all other executives in the top 
management team (pay gap). Specifically:   
(       
                   )
GAP Log Total compensation of CEO Median of total
compensation of other executives in the firm year
= −
 
The second measurement, CEO pay slice (CPS), is computed as the fraction of aggregate 
compensation of the top five members of the executive team that is captured by the CEO.  
CPS = Total compensation of  CEO / total compensation of  top five executives  
An executive’s total compensation is the sum of salary, bonuses and other cash 
compensation. This compensation does not include long-term incentives such as stock 
options and restricted stocks, because these are rarely exercised in China4.     
 
Firm performance 
Our measures of firm performance are return on assets (ROA), firm value (Tobin’s Q), 
stock returns (RET) and return on sales (ROS), defined respectively as the ratio of net income 
to the book value of total assets, the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and the book 
value of debt to total assets, firm annual stock returns and the ratio of net income to total 
                                                             
3 China’s listed firms only disclosed a small portion of individual CEO pay until 2005.  





We also include CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO duality, firm size, board size, board 
composition, leverage, largest shareholder ownership and future investment opportunity as 
control variables. Appendix A.1 provides definitions for all variables.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our sample, including all the variables we use for 
both univariate and multivariate tests. The results show that the mean (median) of CEO pay is 
448,546 (302,200) RMB, which is about five times the average CEO pay of 85,000 (60,000) 
RMB reported by Firth et al. (2007) for the period between 1998 and 2000. Actually, the 
CEO pay increased almost five times between 2005 and 2010. The average CEO pay slice is 
31.88%, which indicates that total CEO compensation accounts for almost one-third of total 
compensation of the top five paid executives. This figure is close, although it’s still lower 
than the 35.70% reported for U.S. executives by Bebchuk et al. (2011). Additionally, the 
board size averages 9.31 in China, with 3.32 serving as independent directors. The average 
proportion of independent directors is 35.66%, which satisfies the requirements of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRS) that independent directors must account for at 
least one-third of the total numbers on boards for all listed firms. In the table's last panel, we 
show the distribution of the firms. In our sample in particular there are 834 firm-year 
observations of politically connected SOEs, and 825 politically connected private firms.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variables  Mean  Median  Lower quartile Higher quartile 
Panel A: Executive compensation 
CEO pay 448,546 302,200 170,000 515,000 
Total of top five executives' pay 1,837,765 1,296,050 760,000 2,150,000 
Panel B: CEO pay dispersion 
Pay gap  250,868 120,050 58,100 245,000 
CEO pay slice (CPS) % 31.88 28.18 24.00 35.58 
Panel C: Firm performance 
ROA (%) 3.38 3.63 1.34 6.49 
Tobin’s Q 1.77 1.42 1.08 1.98 
RET (%) 55.97 26.75 -25.65 114.42 
ROS (%) 7.21 5.80 2.07 12.57 
Panel D: CEO characteristics 
CEO age 46.67 46 42 51 
CEO tenure 3.07 2.5 1 4.5 
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CEO duality 0.16 0 0 0 
New CEO  0.17 0 0 0 
Retiring CEO 0.04 0 0 0 
Inside CEO 0.72 1 0 1 
Number of executives (Novp) 6.69 6 5 8 
Panel D: Firm characteristics and corporate governance 
Firm size (millions) 2,780 2,000 1,010 4,460 
Leverage  48.26 49.33 33.53 62.87 
Board size 9.31 9 9 10 
Independent directors 3.32 3 3 4 
Largest (%) 37.77 36 25.22 49.55 
Managerial ownership (%) 0.0585 0.0329 0.00875 0.1413 
Panel E: firm type distributions     
 SOEs Private firms 
 PC Non-PC PC Non-PC 
Observations 834 3943 825 2579 
Pay gap is defined as the difference in compensation between the CEO and the median level of other executives. 
All the other variables are defined in Appendix A.1.  All the value variables are in terms of China’s currency, the 
RMB. 
  
4.2 Ownership structure, CEO pay dispersion and firm performance 
4.2.1 CEO pay dispersion and firm performance 
To provide some primary evidence to support our hypotheses we conduct the following 
regression to examine whether tournament theory applies in China, reflected by a positive 











               
                                                    (1) 
where PERF is firm performance. We use four measures as the proxies for firm performance: 
return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q), stock returns (RET) and return on sales (ROS). 
PayDispersion is CEO pay dispersion, measured by the GAP and CPS in each regression, 
respectively. Size is the log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. Largest is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder. Board is the log of 
the numbers of directors on the board. Indep is the proportion of independent directors.  
 Table 2 presents the results of the relationship between CEO pay dispersion and firm 
performance. Two measures for CEO pay dispersion are applied in the regression:  GAP and 
CPS. As shown in Table 2, the coefficients on CEO pay dispersion are all estimated to be 
positive and statistically significant (except when stock returns are used as the measurement 
of firm performance),  which indicates that the pay differential effectively provides internal 
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incentives for executives to deliver good firm performance;  this is consistent with the 
prediction of tournament theory. Among the control variables, we find coefficients that are 
consistent with those reported in previous studies (Chen et al., 2009). On one hand, 
accounting performance (ROA and ROS) is positively related to firm size and largest 
shareholder ownership, but negatively related to firm leverage level. On the other hand, firm 
value (Tobin’s Q) is negatively related to firm size and largest shareholder ownership. In 
addition, the results show that across these four specifications the independent directors most 
significantly affect firm value rather than firm accounting or market performance. These 
results are in line with the fact that with China's poor corporate governance system and 
inadequate outside investor protection, shareholders of publicly held firms feel unsure of 
external mechanisms, and therefore place more emphasis on managerial compensation 
because it is believed to be the most effective internal mechanism available (Murphy, 1999; 
Firth et al., 2006b). 
 
Table 2.  Regression of pay-dispersion effect on firm performance 
Panel A: GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q RET ROS 
Constant  -0.20***(-8.52) 5.63***(13.86) 0.16(0.65) -0.52***(-8.84) 
GAP 0.09***(10.41) 0.12***(8.20) 0.01(1.22) 0.05***(8.76) 
Size  0.09***(7.78) -0.21***(-8.97) 0.03**(2.35) 0.03***(9.23) 
Leverage -0.15***(-19.23) -0.64***(-3.07) 0.06(1.02) -0.32***(-18.94) 
Largest 0.05***(7.01) -0.07***(-6.05) -0.03***(-4.67) 0.08***(4.73) 
Board 0.03(0.58) -0.17*(-1.92) -0.03(-0.60) -0.04(-0.34) 
Indep -0.01(-0.50) 1.16***(3.30) -0.30(-1.34) -0.02(-0.40) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Area fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2 
0.23 0.10 0.03 0.19 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q RET ROS 
Constant  -0.15***(-6.36) 5.82***(14.85) 0.55***(2.71) -0.53***(-9.08) 
CPS 0.05**(2.44) 0.02**(2.16) 0.02(1.32) 0.12**(2.47) 
Size  0.02***(10.43) -0.16***(-7.72) 0.02(1.30) 0.04***(12.74) 
Leverage -0.16***(-19.09) -0.70***(-3.48) 0.08(1.23) -0.34***(-20.62) 
Largest 0.04***(5.69) -0.08***(-7.42) -0.03***(-3.81) 0.04***(2.67) 
Board 0.03(0.63) -0.18**(-2.02) -0.05(-0.87) 0.02(0.02) 
Indep -0.05(-0.26) 1.26***(3.72) -0.31(-1.52) -0.02(-0.26) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Area fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2 
0.20 0.10 0.03 0.19 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
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The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay 
dispersion is measured by either GAP or CPS. Size is the log of a firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total 
debts to total assets. Largest is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. Board is the log of the 
total number of directors on a firm's board. Indep is the proportion of independent directors on a firm's board.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, 
clustered by firm.  
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.2.2 Ownership structure and relation between pay dispersion and firm performance 
In this section we analyze whether tournament incentives differ across the ownership 
structure by dividing our total sample into SOEs and private firms. A firm is identified as an 
SOE if the government is the controlling shareholder.  To take a primary look at the effect of 
pay dispersion on firm performance, and the effect of ownership structure on tournament 
incentives, we conduct multivariate analysis to test our hypotheses and provide evidence for 
the association between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance between SOEs and private 











                
*
              (2) 
where PERF is firm performance, measured as return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q), stock 
returns (RET) and return on sales (ROS) in each specification. State is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled by the government. All the other variables are 
defined the same as those in Equation (1). The results of this regression are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Regression of pay-dispersion effect on firm performance between SOEs and 
private firms 
Panel A: GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q         RET           ROS 
Constant  -0.49***(-7.05) 5.01***(6.31) 0.81***(2.98) -0.59***(-5.74) 
GAP 0.08***(5.20) 0.15***(8.22) 0.09(0.55) 0.05***(5.46) 
GAP*State -0.03***(-2.71) -0.03**(-2.45) -0.08(-0.45) -0.01**(-2.29) 
State 0.03(1.62) 0.35(1.35) 0.05(0.19) 0.09***(2.99) 
Size  0.03***(3.97) -0.20***(-6.38) 0.09(0.90) 0.03***(3.27) 
Leverage -0.39***(-2.86) -0.61***(-3.77) 0.06(1.04) -0.32***(-7.57) 
Largest 0.03***(3.36) -0.69***(-8.15) -0.33***(-4.23) 0.08***(7.87) 
Board 0.02**(2.58) -0.17***(-2.65) -0.07(-1.45) 0.02(1.41) 
Indep -0.04(-1.49) 1.01***(3.82) -0.37*(-1.85) -0.03(-0.82) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 





0.42 0.15 0.03 0.20 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q         RET           ROS 
Constant  -0.18***(-7.46) 5.65***(4.55) 0.76***(3.46) -0.57***(-9.90) 
CPS 0.07**(2.01) 0.12***(2.79) 0.15(0.61) 0.08***(2.77) 
CPS*State -0.02**(-2.11) -0.07**(-2.45) -0.03(-0.12) -0.05**(-2.18) 
State 0.02(0.47) 0.05(0.87) 0.05(0.49) 0.04***(5.03) 
Size  0.02***(3.19) -0.15***(-7.61) 0.08(0.85) 0.03***(3.57) 
Leverage -0.16***(-8.68) -0.69***(-3.44) 0.06(1.01) -0.32***(-9.94) 
Largest 0.05***(7.00) -0.81***(-7.00) -0.32***(-4.19) 0.06***(3.93) 
Board 0.01*(1.80) -0.15(-1.61) -0.07(-1.49) 0.01(0.77) 
Indep -0.02(-0.42) 1.24***(3.63) -0.34*(-1.65) -0.02(-0.35) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Area fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2 
0.23 0.10 0.03 0.19 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay 
dispersion is measured by either GAP or CPS. State is a dummy variable coded 1 for state-controlled firms and 
0 for private firms. Size is the log of a firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets. 
Largest is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. Board is the log of the total number of 
directors on a firm's board. Indep is the proportion of independent directors on a firm's board.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, 
clustered by firm.   
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 reports our findings on the effects of pay dispersion on firm performance across 
different ownership structures. We use four measurements – ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns, 
and ROS – as proxies for firm performance. Panel A in the table presents the results using 
GAP as a measure of pay dispersion, while Panel B uses the CPS. With ROA, Tobin’s Q and 
ROS as measures of firm performance, the coefficients on both pay dispersion measures are 
positive and significant. This result is consistent when industry-adjusted ROA, Tobin’s Q and 
ROS are used. This indicates that a large pay gap between the CEO and other top executives 
can provide incentives for the executives to work hard and deliver good firm performance. 
This result is consistent with our hypothesis that a large CEO pay dispersion can increase 
firm performance. However, we are more concerned about the results of the interaction terms 
between pay dispersion and State, since these interaction terms are used to test whether state 
ownership is associated with a weaker relationship between pay dispersion and firm 
performance. The results in Table 3 show that the coefficients of these interaction terms are 
negative and statistically significant, except when stock returns are used as firm performance. 
This result suggests that CEO pay dispersion has a positive effect on firm performance in 
private firms, but that this effect becomes less positive in state-controlled firms. These results 
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are in line with our second hypothesis.  
As discussed above, we believe that the weaker relationship between CEO pay dispersion 
and firm performance in SOEs is attributed to the multiple objectives of the state shareholders. 
However, we have not addressed whether it means that tournament incentives have become 
inefficient in SOEs in China. To answer this question, we choose the SOE sub-sample to 
examine the effectiveness of tournament incentives alongside other objectives. Recently 
Bradshaw et al. (2012) have argued that in SOEs, taxes are a dividend to the state controlling 
shareholder, but a cost to other shareholders. One of the important political objectives of 
bureaucrats is to collect higher taxes. If managers of SOEs make tax decisions that are 
favorable to the government, they are more likely to be promoted in the Chinese bureaucratic 
hierarchy. Bradshaw et al. (2012) find that SOEs have significantly higher tax rates than non-
SOEs, and that the tax rates are negatively associated with stock returns. Following this work, 
we select the tax-payment rates of the SOEs as a proxy for measuring political objectives 
other than economic performance. Empirically, we rerun Equation (2) by replacing State 
dummy with tax payments (using the ratio of the tax payment to total assets as the proxy), 
and use the SOE sub-sample only. The results are reported in Table 4 below. For the sake of 
brevity we report only the coefficients of the key variables. Panel A and B show the results 
using GAP and CPS, respectively, as the measures of CEO pay dispersion, revealing that 
CEO pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. The interaction terms between 
tax payments and CEO pay dispersion are of concern, because the estimated coefficients on 
interaction terms are generally all negative and statistically significant (except where stock 
return is used as a dependent variable). This result shows that in SOEs, CEO pay dispersion is 
less related to firm performance when firms pay higher taxes, indicating that tournament 
incentives are less effective in SOEs with multiple objectives. Moreover, when the combined 
effects of both CEO pay dispersion and its interaction with tax payments are calculated, the 
net results are still positive, indicating that tournament incentives still work in SOEs with 
multiple objectives, but have a weaker effect.  
 
Table 4. Tournament incentives and tax payments in SOEs 
Panel A: Subsample of SOEs 
Dependent variable ROA Q  RET ROS 
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GAP 0.12***(5.42) 0.16***(7.15) 0.05(0.86) 0.23***(6.29) 
Tax 0.07***(2.59) 0.06**(2.08) 0.07(0.50) 0.02***(3.47) 
GAP*Tax -0.06***(-2.77) -0.05**(-2.02) -0.02(-1.00) -0.02***(-3.33) 
Other control variables include firm size, leverage, board size, independent directors, largest ownership, 
year, industry and area fixed effects 
Adj R2 0.49 0.10 0.05 0.17 
Obs 4777 4777 4777 4777 
Panel B: Subsample of SOEs 
Dependent variable ROA Q RET      ROS 
CPS  0.03***(2.73) 0.72***(2.77) -0.32(-0.93) 0.15**(2.34) 
Tax 0.06(0.29) 0.05*(1.75) -0.02(-1.00) 0.05**(2.37) 
CPS*Tax -0.02**(-2.45) -0.06(-1.55) 0.02(0.95) -0.01**(-2.33) 
Other control variables include firm size, leverage, board size, independent directors, largest ownership, 
year, industry and area fixed effects 
Adj R2 0.71 0.10 0.07 0.20 
Obs 4777 4777 4777 4777 
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay 
dispersion is measured by either GAP or CPS.  Tax is the ratio of the amount of taxes payouts to total assets. All 
the other variables are defined as those in the previous tables. 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, 
clustered by firm.  
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3 Political connection, CEO pay dispersion and firm performance 
 This section examines the effect of CEO political connection on the effectiveness of 
tournament incentives. The definition of CEO political connection is consistent with that of 
Fan et al. (2007): a CEO is defined as politically connected if the CEO was or is a 
government official or military official, including the member of the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) or the All-
China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), or an official of other ministries of the 
government or military. We are also interested in examining whether this effect varies 
according to the ownership structure. The main empirical model we estimate is as follows: 
 
(3) 
where PC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. 
All the other variables are defined as in Equation (2). The results of this regression are 
reported in Table 5. 
 
















Panel A: GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q         RET           ROS 
Constant  -0.21***(-9.12) 5.27***(3.48) 0.68***(3.26) -0.60***(-3.31) 
GAP 0.07***(5.58) 0.12***(8.38) 0.09(1.03) 0.06***(8.22) 
GAP*PC -0.03**(-2.35) -0.02**(-2.06) -0.02(-0.32) -0.03***(-2.58) 
PC 0.02(0.28) 0.03(0.34) 0.17(0.34) 0.05(0.45) 
Size  0.07***(7.11) -0.20***(-9.32) 0.02(1.53) 0.03**(3.58) 
Leverage -0.15***(-8.61) -0.62***(-3.27) 0.07(1.06) -0.32**(-2.17) 
Largest 0.05***(8.13) -0.70***(-6.17) -0.31***(-4.17) 0.07***(4.43) 
Board 0.05(1.13) -0.18**(-2.01) -0.05(-1.06) 0.03(0.26) 
Indep -0.09(-0.50) 1.01***(2.90) -0.39*(-1.92) -0.02(-0.48) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Area fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2 
0.24 0.10 0.03 0.20 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q         RET           ROS 
Constant  -0.15***(-6.45) 5.81***(4.75) 0.67***(3.17) -0.52***(-9.13) 
CPS 0.09**(2.26) 0.10**(2.00) 0.18(1.09) 0.04**(2.55) 
CPS*PC -0.02**(-2.28) -0.06**(-2.37) -0.12(-0.25) -0.01**(-2.19) 
PC 0.03(0.76) 0.03(0.39) 0.03(0.17) 0.02(1.35) 
Size  0.02***(4.28) -0.16***(-7.75) 0.02(1.31) 0.03***(2.64) 
Leverage -0.16***(-3.00) -0.70***(-3.48) 0.06(1.04) -0.34***(-2.80) 
Largest 0.04***(5.99) -0.85***(-7.28) -0.30***(-4.10) 0.05***(3.21) 
Board 0.04(0.76) -0.18**(-2.00) -0.05(-1.14) 0.02(0.02) 
Indep -0.03(-0.19) 1.26***(3.73) -0.35*(-1.72) -0.01(-0.23) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Area fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2 
0.21 0.10 0.03 0.19 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
Firm performance is a dependent variable measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay dispersion 
is measured by either GAP or CPS.  PC is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 
otherwise. Size is the log of a firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets. Largest is the 
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. Tenure is the log of years that a CEO has been in that 
position. Age is the log of CEO age. Board is the log of the total number of directors on the boards. Indep is the 
proportion of independent directors on the boards.  
The T-statistics are in parentheses and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error, clustered by firm.  
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5 shows that CEO pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. Here we 
focus on the coefficients of the interaction terms between PC and CEO pay dispersion. 
Across all specifications, the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between CEO pay 
dispersion and PC are negative and statistically significant (except when stock returns are 
used as the firm performance). Specifically, in column 1 of Panel A, the estimated coefficient 
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of the interaction term is -0.03 with 5% significance (t-value is -2.35); this indicates that the 
positive effect of CEO pay dispersion on firm performance becomes weaker when the CEO is 
politically connected, which is consistent with our third hypothesis. In addition, the estimated 
coefficients of PC are positive and only statistically significant when GAP is used as the 
measure of CEO pay dispersion (Panel A)5. This also suggests that executives could build 
political connections with the government and "win the contest" without exerting more effort 
than other executives, thus making tournament incentives weaker. In addition, when a CEO is 
politically connected, other executives lower in the hierarchy find it more difficult to compete, 
which makes tournament incentives less attractive. 
 Furthermore, we divided our sample into two sub-samples that only include SOEs and 
private firms, respectively, and rerun our Equation (3). From the untabulated results, we find 
that the negative effect of political connection on the relationship between pay dispersion and 
firm performance is only significant in privately controlled firms, which supports our third 
hypothesis. Existing studies that examine the effect of CEO political connection in private 
firms in China argue that  SOEs are ultimately controlled by the government, which naturally 
leads to features such as political connections (Li et al., 2008), and therefore the effect of 
politically connected executives will be offset by state ownership. Our results echo that the 
effect of CEO political connection is more significant in private firms, where the positive 
association between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance weakens significantly.  
 
 
4.4 Reform of split-share structure, pay dispersion and firm performance 
In 2005 a split-share structure reform was launched on the Chinese stock market to 
transform shares that were non-tradable on the stock exchanges into tradable. This reform 
started in April 2005 and finished at the end of 20076. Before 2005, Chinese stock exchanges 
were characterized by a split-share structure, where most of the listed firms were either 
                                                             
5 This result indicates that firms with politically connected CEOs may outperform firms with non-politically connected 
CEOs. Our results differ  from Fan et al. (2007), possibly because  they used a sample of newly privatized SOEs from 1993 
to 2001, while our sample includes both SOEs and private firms and ranges  from 2005 to 2010. On the other hand, Fan et al. 
(2007) focus on the stock-market reaction after listing, while we use the returns and firm value as proxies for firm 
performance. 
6 At the end of 2007, almost all listed firms in China complied with the split-share structure reform, and such firms now 
represent 98% of the total market capitalization.  
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directly or indirectly controlled by the government, and the shares held by the government’s 
controlling shareholders were non-tradable (these accounted for almost two-thirds of the total 
shares outstanding7). Holders of non-tradable shares were less likely to benefit from share 
trading on the stock market, and thus tended to focus on accounting performance rather than 
market performance; this was not necessarily consistent with the interests of minority 
shareholders. Moreover, the controlling shareholders extracted private benefits by setting 
operational objectives that were not conducive to the wealth of minority shareholders, but 
only their own private interests (Cao et al., 2011a).  
However, after the split-share structure reform, all common shares outstanding circulated 
on the stock market, and the interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
became aligned to some extent (Li et al., 2011). In other words, all types of shareholders 
could now benefit from improving stock market performance. Thus, evaluations of firm 
performance become more market-oriented and measurable, and stock returns become 
increasingly important. On this basis, therefore, we conjecture that listed firms began to 
transfer the interest on accounting performance to stock returns, and indeed may have reacted 
actively to stock returns after the split-share structure reform. However, since a complicated 
agency problem still exists in the SOEs due to their multiple social responsibilities in addition 
to their obligations to maximize shareholders’ value, we expect that the positive effect of 
share reform will be greater in private firms than in SOEs. 
 To examine the effect of split-share structure reform on the relationship between CEO pay 
dispersion and firm performance, we conduct multivariate tests. Explicitly, we identify the 
completion time of the reform for each firm as the benchmark to divide our total sample into 
before- and after-reform sub-samples.   
 
In particular, we apply a regression analysis and rerun Equation (2) by adding the dummy 
variable Reform, which is equal to 1 for the post-reform period and 0 otherwise, and interact 
it with CEO pay dispersion. The estimated results, reported in Table 6, provide some 
evidence to support our hypotheses. In general, the coefficients on two CEO pay-dispersion 
measures are positive and statistically significant, which supports our first hypothesis, 
                                                             
7 These non-tradable shares can only be transferred after approval by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
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whereas the negative coefficients on the interaction terms between CEO pay dispersion and 
state ownership indicate that tournament incentives are weaker in SOEs, supporting our 
second hypothesis. Some interesting evidence has emerged regarding the effects of the reform, 
particularly in Panel A, where the CEO pay gap is used as CEO pay dispersion, and the 
estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between CEO pay dispersion and the Reform 
dummy are positive and significant when Tobin’s Q and stock returns are used as proxies for 
firm performance. This indicates that since the market development, the positive association 
between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance has been strengthened; this is consistent 
with our fourth hypothesis. Moreover, the negative coefficients on GAP*State*Reform are 
consistent with our hypothesis that the positive effect of the reform on the relationship 
between CEO pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger in private firms than in SOEs; 
this result holds both before and after the market reform. Overall, the general results in Table 
6 suggest that the effect of tournament incentives on firm performance has been enhanced by 
the market development, but the amplification is still weaker in SOEs relative to private firms. 
The results also suggest that executive pay dispersion starts to show a positive effect on stock 
returns after the reform, but not before. 
Furthermore, we try to treat the split-share structure reform as a policy variable that can 
provide an exogenous source of variation in explanatory variables. We revise the sample used 
in Table 6 and  rerun the equation based on a new sample that includes the period from the 
first year of the reform to the year of its completion. This reduced the sample size from the 
original 7,811 firm-year observations to 3,573. These untabulated results are broadly similar 
to those reported in Table 6; this, again, provides supports to our hypotheses after controlling 
for the endogeneity issue.  
 
Table 6. Effect of reform on the relationship between pay dispersion and firm 
performance 
Panel A: GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q         RET           ROS 
Constant  -0.23***(-7.94) 5.05***(8.64) -0.13(-0.53) -0.61***(-8.97) 
GAP 0.06***(5.86) 0.15***(6.12) 0.07(1.18) 0.07***(3.42) 
State 0.03(1.06) 0.45(1.26) 0.10***(2.87) 0.10**(2.11) 
Reform 0.03*(1.90) 1.16***(5.38) 1.73***(8.46) 0.03(0.73) 
GAP*State -0.02**(-2.27) -0.03**(-2.10) -0.03(-0.17) -0.02***(-2.78) 
GAP*Reform 0.02(1.37) 0.06***(3.29) 0.12***(7.21) 0.01**(2.36) 
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GAP*State*Reform -0.01**(-1.96) -0.03***(-2.74) -0.03***(2.95) -0.02**(-2.01) 
Size  0.02***(7.98) -0.23***(-9.50) -0.02(-0.20) 0.03***(9.16) 
Leverage -0.15***(-8.23) -0.50***(-2.87) 0.12*(1.80) -0.32***(-9.17) 
Largest 0.06***(8.67) -0.66***(-5.80) -0.28***(-3.65) 0.08***(4.78) 
Board 0.02*(1.87) -0.09(-0.92) -0.03(-0.67) 0.01(0.89) 
Indep -0.01(-0.63) 0.69**(1.99) -0.57***(-2.73) -0.03(-0.56) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Area fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2 
0.25 0.15 0.02 0.20 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q         RET           ROS 
Constant  -0.17***(-7.25) 6.05***(9.55) 0.97***(4.28) -0.56***(-9.60) 
CPS 0.06***(2.86) 0.07**(2.05) 0.19(0.86) 0.05***(2.62) 
State 0.02(1.15) 0.02(0.18) 0.06*(1.71) 0.05(1.60) 
Reform 0.03(0.98) 0.43***(8.72) 0.19**(2.24) 0.01(1.18) 
CPS*State -0.02**(-2.37) -0.03**(-2.24) -0.03(-0.27) -0.02***(-2.74) 
CPS*Reform 0.02*(1.91) 0.18(1.15) 0.09**(2.33) 0.05*(1.81) 
CPS*State*Reform -0.01***(-2.78) -0.01**(-2.06) -0.10***(-2.68) -0.01**(-2.42) 
Size  0.02***(10.85) -0.19***(-9.45) -0.01(-1.18) 0.04***(13.13) 
Leverage -0.16***(-8.43) -0.56***(-3.11) 0.10(1.56) -0.32***(-9.59) 
Largest 0.05***(7.02) -0.75***(-6.49) -0.27***(-3.43) 0.06***(3.93) 
Board 0.02*(1.85) -0.05(-0.58) -0.03(-0.65) 0.02(0.82) 
Indep -0.01(-0.45) 0.92***(2.74) -0.53**(-2.55) -0.02(-0.39) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Area fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2 
0.23 0.13 0.05 0.20 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
Firm performance is a dependent variable measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay dispersion 
is measured by either GAP or CPS. State is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has the government as the 
controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise. Reform is a dummy variable coded 1 for post reform period and 0 
otherwise. Size is the log of a firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets. Largest is the 
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. Board is the log of the total number of directors on the 
boards. Indep is the proportion of independent directors on the boards.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, 
clustered by firm.  
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
5. Robustness tests 
5.1. Endogeneity 
Murphy (1999) and Firth et al. (2007) argue that it is effective to make managerial 
compensation a function of firm performance to solve the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. Moreover, Palia (2001) suggests that managerial compensation 
and firm performance are jointly determined. Since pay dispersion is related to managerial 
compensation, we consider it to be endogenously determined. If this is the case, the OLS 
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regression analysis will result in biased estimation results. To address the issue of 
endogeneity and examine whether our results are robust, we follow Kale et al. (2009) in 
applying a two-stage least square (2SLS) 8 . In the first stage we regress the CEO pay 
dispersion against a set of control variables and instrumental variables, as per the discussion 
in Kale et al. (2009)9. In the second stage we replace the CEO pay dispersion with the 
predicted value obtained from the first stage in our main regression. We report the results 
from the second stage in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 presents the results from the second stage of Equation (2) using the 2SLS method 
of estimation. Panel A uses GAP as a measure of pay dispersion and Panel B uses CPS. We 
mainly focus on the coefficients of pay dispersion and the interaction terms between pay 
dispersion and the State dummy. The results of the regression show significantly positive 
coefficients on all pay-dispersion measurements (except the RET regression), and 
significantly negative coefficients on interaction terms across four specifications. The general 
results from Table 7 are broadly similar to those in Table 3. Again, these results indicate that 
pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance, and that this positive relationship is 
weaker in firms where the controlling shareholder is the state. We also apply the 2SLS to 
estimate all the other equations and get similar results to those reported in Table 3 to 6. For 
the sake of brevity, we do not report these results in this paper.  
 
Table 7.  2SLS estimation of pay dispersion on firm performance (second stage) 
Panel A: GAP is used as pay dispersion 
Dependent variable ROA Q RET          ROS 
Constant  -0.19**(-2.01) 4.86***(3.15) -0.01(-0.07) -0.68***(-4.33) 
GAP 0.09***(2.85) 0.12***(8.12) 0.22(0.07) 0.15***(7.25) 
GAP*State -0.02***(-2.62) -0.07**(-2.45) -0.02(-1.63) -0.03**(-2.49) 
State 0.09(1.62) 0.02(0.56) 0.02*(1.72) 0.02***(3.72) 
Size  0.08***(9.45) -0.17***(-9.32) 0.02***(3.26) 0.05**(2.15) 
Leverage -0.12***(-2.80) -0.91***(-7.42) 0.12***(4.88) -0.32***(-9.48) 
Largest 0.04***(6.09) -0.75***(-6.64) -0.02(-0.64) 0.06***(3.41) 
Board 0.02(0.67) -0.15*(-1.64) -0.02(-0.91) 0.02(0.47) 
Indep -0.02(-1.42) 1.08***(3.20) -0.03(-0.04) -0.04(-0.89) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
                                                             
8 As for selecting the instrumental variables, we follow Kale et al. (2009) and choose industry firm median pay dispersion.  
9
 Other control variables include CEO tenure, CEO age, CEO duality, New CEO dummy, Insider CEO dummy, Retired CEO 
dummy, number of executives in the top management team, number of directors, ratio of independent directors to total 
number of directors, managerial ownership and volatility of stock returns. These variables are defined in Appendix A.1. 
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Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Area fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2 
0.25 0.12 0.03 0.21 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
Panel B: CPS is used as firm performance 
Dependent variable ROA Q RET            ROS 
Constant  -0.16***(-8.14) 5.36***(4.77) -0.04(-0.32) -0.63***(-9.55) 
CPS 0.06**(2.30) 0.10**(2.10) 0.18(0.33) 0.06***(2.90) 
CPS*State -0.03***(-2.88) -0.05**(-2.40) -0.02(-0.39) -0.02**(-2.21) 
State 0.02(0.76) 0.07*(1.88) 0.01(0.92) 0.03***(4.83) 
Size  0.02***(3.07) -0.15***(-7.44) 0.02**(2.11) 0.04**(4.25) 
Leverage -0.14**(-2.25) -0.99***(-8.04) 0.15***(5.81) -0.34***(-3.02) 
Largest 0.03***(4.38) -0.85***(-7.40) -0.02(-0.46) 0.05**(2.46) 
Board 0.03(0.72) -0.15(-1.56) -0.03(-1.20) 0.01(0.45) 
Indep -0.02(-1.23) 1.15***(3.36) -0.03(-0.28) -0.03(-0.67) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Area fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Adj R
2 
0.22 0.10 0.02 0.20 
Obs 7811 7811 7811 7811 
Firm performance is a dependent variable measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, RET and ROS. Pay dispersion is 
measured by either GAP or CPS. State is a dummy variable coded 1 for state-controlled firms and 0 otherwise. 
Size is the log of firm’s total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debts to total assets. Largest is the proportion of 
shares held by the largest shareholders. Board is the log of the total number of directors on the boards. Indep is 
the proportion of independent directors on the boards.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, 
clustered by firms,  
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
5.2. Other robustness tests 
5.2.1 Agency problems in family-controlled firms 
The first concern may be related to the application of tournament theory for those firms 
with agency issues between controlling and minority shareholders. Existing literature 
suggests that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the controlling 
shareholders reflects the expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; 
Lemmon and Lin, 2003). Therefore, we create a new variable, Wedge, defined as the 
difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholders; this 
variable aims to capture the dominance of the agency problem between controlling and 
minority shareholders. Empirically, we rerun our Equation (2), replacing the State dummy 
with Wedge and using only the sub-sample of private firms. In the unreported results we find 
that the CEO pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance, and the coefficients of 
Wedge and the interaction terms between Wedge and CEO pay dispersion are both negative 
but insignificant. These results indicate that the tournament theory still applies without 
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significant change in private firms when we control for the agency problem between 
controlling and minority shareholders. One possible explanation is that some of China’s 
private firms are carved out from the former state-owned firms, and the ultimate controlling 
shareholders are usually several private entities. While the agency problem between the 
largest shareholders and other shareholders is not as severe as if the ultimate controller is an 
individual or a family, the agency problem between shareholders and managers still exists, 
since those private firms need to select managers to operate them. Therefore, the tournament 
incentive is generally still relevant in these private firms.  
Now the question is whether tournament theory will also be relevant to family controlled 
firms where the CEO is also a member of the same family of shareholders, which would 
mitigate the agency problems between shareholders and managers. We expect that the owner 
CEO in family controlled firms will substitute for the tournament and reduce the 
effectiveness of tournament incentives. To test the effectiveness of tournament theory, we 
identify family controlled firms where CEO is the member of the family controlling 
shareholders, and create a new dummy variable Owner_CEO, which is equal to 1 for these 
firms. Empirically, we rerun our Equation (2) by replacing the State dummy with the 
Owner_CEO dummy, using only the sub-sample of private firms.  
The results are reported in Table 8. The regression results show that the coefficients on 
CEO pay dispersion are all positive and statistically significant (the only marginal 
significance relates to stock returns), indicating the application of tournament theory. The 
interaction terms between the CEO pay dispersion and Owner_CEO provide some interesting 
evidence. Across these specifications, the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative 
and significant, indicating that tournament incentives are weaker in firms where the CEO is 
also from the same family and is the ultimate controlling shareholder of the firm. These 
results suggest that in family-controlled firms where CEOs come from family shareholders, 
the owner-CEOs have more incentive to maximize firm value and less need to receive 
additional incentives through compensation from the firms; this is consistent with the 
prediction for the family-control incentive alignment hypothesis (McConaughy, 2000), and 
findings that family CEOs are unlikely to act against the interests of the company (Amoako-
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Adu et al., 2011).  
 
Table 8. Tournament incentives and family-controlled firms 
Panel A:GAP is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q  RET    ROS 
GAP 0.06***(3.06) 0.19***(3.36) 0.03(1.62) 0.03***(2.84) 
Owner_CEO -0.03(-1.26) 0.72(1.08) 1.03***(3.31) -0.13***(-2.62) 
GAP*Owner_CEO -0.01(-0.40) -0.06***(-3.90) -0.06**(-2.34) -0.01**(-2.17) 
Other control variables include firm size, leverage, board size, independent directors, largest ownership, 
year, industry and area fixed effects 
Adj R2 0.20 0.08 0.03 0.18 
Obs 3034 3034 3034 3034 
Panel B: CPS is used as the CEO pay-dispersion measurement 
Dependent variable ROA Q RET      ROS 
CPS  0.02**(2.01) 0.22**(2.49) 0.27(1.32) 0.05**(2.42) 
Owner_CEO -0.01(-1.48) 0.18(1.41) 0.42***(5.96) -0.02*(-1.84) 
CPS*Owner_CEO -0.03**(-2.45) -0.24***(-3.53) -0.33(-1.55) -0.02**(-2.45) 
Other control variables include firm size, leverage, board size, independent directors, largest ownership, 
year, industry and area fixed effects 
Adj R2 0.20 0.10 0.03 0.18 
Obs 3034 3034 3034 3034 
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROS. Pay 
dispersion is measured by either GAP or CPS. Owner_CEO is a dummy variable equal to 1 for family controlled 
firms where the CEO is also the control family member. All the other variables are defined as in the previous 
tables. 
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, 
clustered by firm.  
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
5.2.2 Other components of CEO compensation 
The second concern may be related to the absence of stock options and perks in CEO 
compensation, as only cash components are used to calculate pay dispersion in this paper. 
The other major component of CEO compensation is long-term incentives such as stock 
options. In our previous empirical analysis we did not consider stock options when 
calculating CEO compensation: stock options are rarely granted in China’s listed firms, and 
during our sample period there were fewer than 50 firms granting stock options to CEOs. 
However, due to data limitations it is impossible to calculate the values of stock options. Thus, 
we create the dummy variable Options, which is equal to 1 if stock options are granted for the 
specific firm-year observation. To see whether our results hold with the consideration of 
stock options, we rerun our Equation (2) by replacing the State dummy with the Options 
dummy using the full sample.  The (unreported) results show that CEO pay dispersion is 
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positively related to firm performance. Furthermore, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
between CEO pay dispersion and Options are positive and insignificant, indicating that 
excluding stock options will not change our main conclusions. 
In addition, the literature also suggests that as part of CEO compensation, perks play an 
important role in providing incentives for executives in Chinese listed firms (Adithipyangkul 
et al., 2011). Following their work, we create the variable Perks, which equals the sum of the 
expenditures, including company cars, communications, socializing, meals, travel and 
entertainment, disclosed in the footnotes of firms’ cash-flow statements in their annual 
reports. Since these expenditures are consumed by all top executives (not just CEOs) for both 
work and personal use, perks are not considered to be part of individual CEOs' compensation. 
However, our relevant question here is whether the effectiveness of tournament incentives is 
mitigated with the consumption of perks. We therefore rerun Equation (2) by replacing the 
State dummy with Perks. In the (unreported) results, we find that CEO pay dispersion 
continues to affect firm performance positively. More importantly, we find that perks relate to 
better firm performance but do not affect tournament incentives, as reflected by an 
insignificant coefficient on the interaction term between Perks and CEO pay dispersion. We 
further replicate our regression using the SOE sub-sample, obtaining similar results to those 
for the full sample. These results suggest that our findings associated with tournament 
incentives generally hold after considering other components of CEO compensation, 
including options and perks. 
Some studies on China have argued that the Chairman is the highest-paid executive, and 
is also higher in status than the CEO (Firth et al., 2006b). They argue that the Chairman is the 
key person with the responsibility for making critical decisions.  To take the situation of 
Chairman into account, we apply two alternative proxies for pay dispersion and repeat the 
analysis detailed above. These two alternative proxies are the difference between the 
Chairman’s compensation and the median compensation of all the other executives, and the 
ratio of the Chairman’s compensation to the total compensation of the top five executives. 
The general results are broadly similar to those reported from Table 2 to Table 810.  
                                                             
10 When the Chairman’s compensation is applied, some control variables of CEO characteristics, such as CEO age, tenure 
and managerial ownership, are replaced with the Chairman’s characteristics.  
29 
 
We further check the robustness of the positive relationship between pay dispersion and 
firm performance by partitioning the entire sample on the basis of industry structure, firm 
size and ownership structure. Industry effects may be significant due to regulation and 
monopoly, although firms in high-technology industries usually set a higher pay dispersion to 
attract and retain their managers (Lee et al., 2008). To examine this we divide the total sample 
into high-technology and non-high-technology industries. The results across these two 
regressions are similar to those in Table 2.  
Murphy (1999) suggests that a firm’s operational complexity plays an important role in 
setting managerial compensation and pay dispersion. Since organizational complexity calls 
for high-quality managers, it is possible that in complicated firms, pay dispersion may lead to 
better firm performance. We proxy for firm complexity by firm size and divide our sample 
into quartiles. After examining the impact of pay dispersion on firm performance in the 
regression analysis, we find that the effect of pay dispersion is insignificant when firm size is 
in the lowest quartile. These results suggest that pay dispersion is more strongly associated 
with firm performance in larger firms.  
We also test the robustness of our estimation results by using alternative measures of pay 
dispersion, including (1) the coefficient of variation in CEO and other executive 
compensation; (2) the ratio of CEO pay to the median of other executive compensation; and 
(3) the difference between CEO compensation and the second-highest executive 
compensation. Our results using these alternatives are qualitatively similar to the reported 
results.  When we use the alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance to re-
estimate Equation (2), the result that pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance 
is robust. In particular, a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term between 
State dummy and pay dispersion suggests that the positive relationship between pay 
dispersion and firm performance is weaker in SOEs. This relationship is also consistently 
observed when alternative measures are used in the 2SLS estimation. More importantly, the 
association between pay dispersion and stock returns becomes significant after the ‘split-




The issue relating to the pay gap between CEOs and other executives in the top 
management team has recently received a considerable amount of attention. An appropriate 
pay scheme is essential to the success of SOE reform. Information about executive 
compensation in China’s listed firms has been disclosed since 1998, and more completely 
since 2005. We have taken advantage of this information to investigate pay dispersion and its 
effect on firm performance in China’s listed firms using a sample ranging from 2005 to 2010.  
Consistent with tournament theory and previous research (Kale et al., 2009; Chen et al., 
2011a), we find that pay dispersion is positively related to firm performance. We also find 
that the positive association between pay dispersion and firm performance is weaker in SOEs 
than in privately controlled firms, because SOEs are required to achieve multiple economic 
and social goals such as the remittance of tax to governments and alternative incentive 
schemes. Moreover, the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance is 
weakened by CEOs' political connections, and we find that this less-positive effect is 
significant in private firms. We specifically find that the positive relationship between CEO 
pay dispersion and firm performance has been strengthened since the split-share structure 
reform, but the positive effect of this reform is weaker in SOEs than in private firms. 
Furthermore, we also find that a significantly positive effect of CEO pay dispersion on stock 
returns emerged after the split-share structure reform. We provide evidence that state 
ownership and political connection exert a value-destroying effect by weakening the positive 
effect of tournament incentives, while market reform improves economic efficiency by 
strengthening tournament incentives. We argue that in SOEs the satisfaction gained from 
multiple economic and social goals, such as the remittance of tax imposed by governments, 
has largely reduced the effectiveness of tournament incentives; moreover, in family-
controlled firms where the CEO is also the family owner, the tournament theory does not 
hold at all. Overall, our results suggest that in an emerging market, a Chinese firm's 
institutional features, such as state ownership and political connections, play important roles 
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Appendix A.1. Definitions of variables  
Variable  Definition  
Panel A: Managerial compensation 
CEO compensation (CPAY) Total cash compensation for CEO 
Top executive compensation (TPAY) Total cash compensation for top five executives 
 
Panel B: Pay dispersion 
GAP Log of difference between CEO pay and median of 
other executive pay  
CEO pay slice (CPS) CPAY/TPAY 
 
Panel C: Firm performance 
Return on assets (ROA) Net income/total assets 
Tobin’s Q Market value/replacement value 
Stock returns (RET) Firm annual stock return 
Return on sales (ROS) Net income/total sales 
 
Panel D: CEO characteristics 
CEO age (Age) Log of the age of the CEO   
CEO tenure (Tenure) Log of the number of years as the firm’s CEO  
CEO duality (Duality) Equals 1 if CEO also chairs the board 
New CEO (New) Equals 1 for first year as CEO 
Retiring CEO (Retire) Equals 1 if CEO’s age is more than 62 
Inside CEO (Insider) Equals 1 if CEO is promoted from inside 
Number of executives (Novp) Log of the number of top executives  
 
Panel E: Firm characteristics and corporate governance 
Firm size (Size) Log of total assets 
Board size (Board) Log of the number of directors on the board 
% Independent director (Pond) Proportion of independent directors on the board 
Leverage (Lev) Total debts/total assets in book value 
Investment opportunity (Invest) Total assets growth ratio 
Largest shareholder (Largest) Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder 
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